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Fiscal Decentralisation and Inequality in Indonesia 1
The study examined the effect of fiscal decentralisation on both vertical and horizontal inequality in 32 
provinces of Indonesia in the period from 2005 to 2014 using several fixed effects (FE) estimations. Moreover, 
we assessed the mediating role of institutional quality in explaining the nexus between fiscal decentralisation 
and inequality. To complement the econometrics results, we conducted several semi-structured interviews 
(SSIs) based on expert judgement and focus group discussions (FGDs) among relevant stakeholders. This 
analysis focussed on the intergovernmental transfer policy designed and implemented at the sub-national 
government level. Such qualitative analysis started in the last week of March 2019 and ended in the first week 
of July 2019. The quantitative findings showed that there was a robust, positive, and significant relationship 
between fiscal decentralisation and vertical inequality when democracy was taken into account. Meanwhile, 
fiscal decentralisation was negatively correlated with horizontal inequality when the estimation included so-
cial capital. In addition, fiscal decentralisation appears to have a marginal impact on horizontal inequality 
when both democracy and the crime rate are considered in the full sample analysis. However, when we ex-
cluded provinces located in Java Island, the impact of fiscal decentralisation on horizontal inequality became 
clear. Regarding the qualitative aspect, the fieldwork results were consistent with the quantitative findings. 
Keywords: fiscal decentralisation, vertical inequality, horizontal inequality, institutional quality, sub-national gov-
ernment, mixed method, fixed effects, semi-structured interviews, focus group discussion, Indonesia
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Фискальная децентрализация и неравенство в Индонезии
Статья посвящена исследованию влияния фискальной децентрализации как на вертикальное, так и на гори-
зонтальное неравенство в 32 провинциях Индонезии в период с 2005 г. по 2014 г. с использованием оценки с фик-
сированными эффектами. Связь между фискальной децентрализацией и неравенством объясняется посредством 
оценки качества институциональной среды. В качестве дополнения к результатам эконометрического анализа в 
2019 г. было проведено несколько полуструктурированных интервью, основанных на экспертных оценках и обсужде-
ниях в фокус-группах стейкхолдеров. Тема обсуждений — политика межбюджетных трансфертов, разработанная 
и реализованная на субнациональном уровне правительства. Количественные результаты показали, что суще-
ствует прочная положительная и значимая взаимосвязь между фискальной децентрализацией и вертикальным 
неравенством при учете показателя «уровень демократии». Между тем, фискальная децентрализация отрица-
тельно коррелировала с горизонтальным неравенством, если в оценку был включен социальный капитал. Кроме 
того, при полном анализе выборки с учетом показателей «уровень демократии» и «уровень преступности» фи-
скальная децентрализация лишь незначительно влияет на горизонтальное неравенство. Однако при исключении 
из выборки провинций, расположенных на острове Ява, влияние фискальной децентрализации на горизонтальное 
неравенство становится очевидным. Результаты качественного анализа соответствуют результатам количе-
ственного анализа.
Ключевые слова: фискальная децентрализация, вертикальное неравенство, горизонтальное неравенство, ка-
чество институциональной среды, субнациональное правительство, смешанный метод, фиксированные эффекты, 
полуструктурированные интервью, обсуждение в фокус-группах, Индонезия
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1. Introduction
Over the past few decades, many central gov-
ernments in developing countries have essentially 
delegated the political, administrative, and fiscal 
powers to their sub-national governments. In line 
with this argument, Garman et al. analysed that, 
at the beginning of the 2000s, more than 80 % of 
the 75 developing countries have implemented 
decentralisation policies [1]. Since then, the num-
ber of developing countries relying on decentral-
isation principles has increased rapidly, based on 
the countries’ characteristics such as fiscal capac-
ity, population, and colonial origins.
Considering the above, Faguet’s report pro-
vided the critical reasons behind such a phe-
nomenon [1]. For example, policymakers in Peru, 
Cambodia, Mexico, India and Tanzania revealed 
that decentralisation could increase community 
participation and democracy, as well as strengthen 
public accountability and government effective-
ness. Moreover, it could decrease inequality in ac-
cess. Meanwhile, in the different cases, such as in 
Colombia, South Africa, and Ethiopia, policymak-
ers considered decentralisation in the provision of 
public goods and services as a means to abate eth-
nic conflict, and or separatist movements.
Besides the economic crisis that occurred in the 
period 1998–1999, the development of decentrali-
sation in Indonesia cannot be separated from the 
grievance motive stated in the literature of inter-
nal conflict. According to Murshed and Tadjoeddin, 
it is related to the difference between aspirations 
and achievements [2]. During economic crisis, local 
population in some resource-rich regions outside 
the Java Island, such as Aceh, Riau, East Kalimantan, 
East Timor, and Papua, experienced frustration due 
to “relative deprivation”. More specifically, central 
governments have marginalised these territories in 
terms of development, as the regions have not re-
ceived a fair return on their natural resources for a 
longer period. Thus, to defuse the conflict, central 
government initiated the so-called “special auton-
omy” status to those resource-rich regions. Some 
991K. Digdowiseiso, E. Sugiyanto, H. D. Setiawan
Экономика региона, Т. 16, вып. 3 (2020)
of them chose to stay, while East Timor held a ref-
erendum and became independent.
Several scholars have tried analysing the nexus 
between fiscal decentralisation and inequality. For 
example, Sepulveda and Martinez-Vazquez found 
that the size of government played a critical role in 
the nexus between fiscal decentralisation and dis-
tributions of income in 56 countries [3]. However, 
given the role of government size, Lessmann 
stated that fiscal decentralisation was negatively 
and significantly correlated with income inequal-
ity in 54 countries [4]. In another study, Goerl and 
Seiferling showed that the decentralisation of re-
distributive spending appeared to have no signif-
icant impact on income inequality in 48 countries 
[5]. In Indonesia, Siddique et al. found that fiscal 
decentralisation gave a positive contribution to 
expenditure inequality [6]. 
From the above analysis, we can see that the ef-
fect of fiscal decentralisation on inequality is un-
reliable. In addition, current studies only explain 
a common measurement of vertical inequality, 
Gini coefficient, which refers to the population in-
equality. However, such measurement cannot cap-
ture the dimension of horizontal inequality, which 
refers to inequality between different ethno-social 
groups or regions [7]. In addition, none of the re-
cent works can provide a clear explanation on the 
role of institutional quality in the nexus between 
fiscal decentralisation and inequality. Therefore, 
the main objective of our study is to fill these gaps. 
This paper examines the effect of fiscal decen-
tralisation on both vertical and horizontal inequal-
ity in 32 provinces in the period from 2005 to 2014 
by implementing several fixed effects (FE) estima-
tions. In this context, we used Law No. 32/2004 
on Local Governments and Law No. 33/2004 on 
Fiscal Balance between the Central Government 
and Local Governments as a basis for the analy-
sis, since both regulations match the time-frame 
of our research. Additionally, we wanted to ex-
plore whether fiscal decentralisation is more ef-
fective for reducing both vertical and horizontal 
inequalities due to better implementation of in-
stitutional quality. To complement the economet-
ric findings, we conducted several semi-structured 
interviews (SSIs) based on expert judgement and 
focus group discussions (FGDs) among relevant 
stakeholders on the role of institutional quality. 
This approach could largely explain how intergov-
ernmental transfer policy is planned and imple-
mented in the city of Depok and regency of Bekasi 
in West Java Province.
The next section presents literature review 
of fiscal decentralisation in Indonesia, as well as 
on the relationship between fiscal decentralisa-
tion and inequality. We then describe a new da-
taset and methodology that are closely related to 
the aspects of inequality in Indonesia. Before ex-
amining the conclusions, we explain the obtained 
econometric results based on several character-
istics such as fiscal, institutional quality, and de-
mography. This part is followed by a qualitative 
analysis of institutional quality of our case study. 
2. Literature Review
The 2003 World Bank’s report gives a histor-
ical overview of the development of decentrali-
sation system in Indonesia [8]. Accordingly, the 
Indonesian government has implemented decen-
tralisation under Law No. 1/1945. At that time, the 
Dutch were reluctant to give up their colonial pos-
session and started to establish several Indonesian 
republics outside the Java Island (e.g. Republic of 
South Maluku). This situation lasted for less than 
a year, and Indonesia reverted to a unitary state. 
The issue of decentralisation came to the sur-
face again with Law No. 5/1974. However, this law 
has not been implemented properly until 1992. 
In principle, this law assigned several affairs and 
each region had to prove to the central govern-
ment that they were ready to conduct these affairs. 
Finally, the economic crisis hit Indonesia in 
1997; political and social instability continued in 
1998. As a part of the reforms, the Government of 
Indonesia (GoI) was advised by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank to ac-
celerate the decentralisation process [9]. Such a 
process led to the enactment of Law No. 22/1999 
on Local Government and Law No. 25/1999 on the 
Fiscal Balance between the Central Government 
and the Local Governments that established 
Indonesia’s administrative and fiscal decentrali-
sation strategy. 
After a two-year preparation, Indonesia offi-
cially entered a new era of decentralisation on 1 
January 2001. Up to now, there has been a consid-
erable number of amendments for both laws. For 
example, Law No. 22/1999 was replaced by Law No. 
32/2004 and then by Law No. 23/2014. Additionally, 
Law No. 25/1999 was replaced by Law No. 33/2004 
and currently the new amendment is still being 
revised by the House of Representatives. With 
most of the affairs delegated to the sub-national 
level, there has been a shift from highly central-
ised expenditure, dominated by the central budget 
(APBN, Anggaran Pendapatan Belanja Negara) 
to decentralised expenditures dominated by the 
district and provincial budget (APBD, Anggaran 
Pendapatan Belanja Daerah). 
Before Indonesia embarked on a new era of de-
centralisation, the intergovernmental fiscal trans-
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fers from the central government to the provin-
cial and the district/city governments were made 
through a block grant concept, where the larg-
est components were the subsidies for auton-
omous regions (SDO, Subsidi Daerah Otonom) 
and President Instruction (INPRES, Instruksi 
Presiden). On the one hand, the SDO was used 
to finance the salaries of civil servants and other 
current expenditures in the regions. On the other 
hand, the INPRES undertook expenditures for de-
velopment in the regions.
From 2001 onwards, the GoI introduced general 
allocation fund (DAU, Dana Alokasi Umum), spe-
cific allocation fund (DAK, Dana Alokasi Khusus), 
and revenue sharing fund (DBH, Dana Bagi Hasil) 
based on natural resources and tax revenue. All 
of them are the components of the new intergov-
ernmental fiscal transfer (Balancing Fund, Dana 
Perimbangan). Hence, the 2001 decentralisation 
was widely regarded as decentralisation of ex-
penditure, as opposed to decentralisation of rev-
enue, for the following reasons [10]: 1) the bulk 
of local governments’ expenditures was mostly fi-
nanced by the balancing fund; 2) the sub-national 
governments still had a limited local taxing power. 
To date, the share of local own revenue in to-
tal local government revenue accounted for 10 % 
and 47 % in the budget of all districts/cities and 
provinces, respectively. Simultaneously, the share 
of balancing fund in total local government rev-
enue accounted for 76 % and 32 %, respectively. 
Although sub-national governments received an 
annual increase in terms of the number of inter-
governmental fiscal transfers from the central gov-
ernment, some researchers stated the efficiency in 
spending as a major issue. For example, the World 
Bank’s findings showed that the largest expendi-
ture for local government was for government ad-
ministration, which constituted 38 % of total ex-
penditure at the provincial level and 30 % at the 
district/city level [11]. In another study, Firman ar-
gued that sub-national governments have mostly 
used their intergovernmental fiscal transfers for 
employee expenditures such as salary and wages 
[12]. With little attention paid to public service 
expenditures (e.g. infrastructure, health, and edu-
cation), such an approach could potentially dete-
riorate the development of sub-national govern-
ments in Indonesia. 
Recently, many scholars have attempted to 
examine how fiscal decentralisation affects in-
equality. For example, in the period 1971–2000, 
Sepulveda and Martinez-Vazquez observed 56 
countries to analyse the fiscal decentralisation–
inequality nexus [3]. Concerned with the endo-
geneity issue, they implemented a generalised 
two-stage least square procedure. The research-
ers found that government size played a signifi-
cant role in the fiscal decentralisation — inequal-
ity nexus. 
During the same observation period as 
Sepulveda and Martinez-Vazquez did, Sacchi and 
Salotti implemented various fixed effects (FE) 
techniques in 23 OECD countries [13]. The findings 
showed that tax expenditure did not significantly 
impact inequality. However, there was a positive 
association between tax revenue and income ine-
quality. As opposed to Sacchi and Salotti’s object 
of analysis, Bojanic studied 11 countries in the 
Americas over the period 1972–2012 [14]. Armed 
with Government Financial Statistics (GFS), he 
found that decentralisation had a minimal impact 
on inequality. 
In another study, during the period from 1980 
to 2010, Goerl and Seiferling implemented fixed 
effects (FE) model in 48 countries [5]. They found 
that there was no significant impact of decentral-
isation of redistributive spending on income in-
equality. In addition, there was a hump-shaped 
relationship between total expenditure decen-
tralisation and income inequality. In contrast, 
Lessmann discovered that fiscal decentralisation 
was negatively correlated with regional inequal-
ity [4].
To sum up, the role of institutional quality and 
horizontal inequality is often neglected in the 
aforementioned empirical estimates. Therefore, 
our study will contribute to the literature focussed 
on fiscal decentralisation and inequality. 
3. Methodological Approach
In this study, we obtained the data on our de-
pendent variables, expenditure Gini and group Gini 
indexes based on ethnicity for the period 2005–
2014, from the National Socio-Economic Survey 
(SUSENAS, Survei Sosial Ekonomi Nasional) and 
the last decadal census at inter-regional level in 
Indonesia, which were conducted by our statisti-
cal agency (BPS, Badan Pusat Statistik). Similarly, 
for the control variables, we incorporated the 
number of population and GRDP (Gross Regional 
Domestic Product) per capita over the period 
2005–2014 from SUSENAS. Such data come from 
the aggregate number of population and GRDP 
per capita in districts and cities within one prov-
ince in Indonesia. 
Meanwhile, for the variable of interest, we ob-
tained annual data on the share of intergovern-
mental fiscal transfers from the annual Local 
Budget (APBD, Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja 
Daerah) at the inter-regional level, which is com-
piled by the Ministry of Finance (MoF). According 
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to Law No. 32/2004, both DAU and DBH are cat-
egorised as block grants, which gives each lo-
cal government complete discretion in spending. 
Meanwhile, DAK is described as a specific transfer, 
meaning that the central government regulates 
the use of the fund to meet the national priori-
ties at the local level; there is a matching grant of 
ten percent every time local government receives 
such transfer. 
We also measured institutional quality by ap-
plying the concept from Rothstein and Teorell 
[15]. Accordingly, the quality of institution can be 
assessed in terms of input and output levels. In the 
former, we consider incorporating the democracy 
index related to the access to government power. 
However, this is not a sufficient criterion to ex-
plain government quality at the macro (e.g. coun-
try) level [15]. In our study, the democracy index 
is a composite index from civil freedom, politi-
cal rights, and democratic institution, which equal 
zero (0) if regions belong to the authoritarian re-
gime and one hundred (100) if regions have full 
experience in democracy. Data on democracy are 
obtained from BPS and are available for the period 
from 2009 to 2014. 
In addition to the input level, we also measured 
institutional quality at the output level. At first, 
we used the crime rate associated with the term of 
“law and order” since it reflects the quality of law 
enforcement and the capacity of law enforcement 
in preventing and punishing criminals [1]. Thus, 
both law and order are one of the dimensions in 
government quality at the macro level [15]. In this 
study, data on crime rate are related to the number 
of crime scenes or events at the province level and 
are compiled by BPS every year from 2007 to 2014. 
Another aspect of institutional quality at 
the output level is social capital. According to 
Grootaert and van Bastelaer, such an indicator 
can measure government quality at the micro (e.g. 
communities) level [16]. In this study, social cap-
ital variable is a composite index including trust 
and tolerance, participation in groups and net-
work, as well as reciprocity and collective action. 
The index equals zero (0) if regions have no so-
cial capital at all and one hundred (100) if regions 
are characterised by an abundance of social capi-
tal. The social capital data were obtained from BPS 
and are available for 2007, 2009, 2012, and 2014.
Overall, Table 1 presents the summary statistics 
of inequality estimates in Indonesia. On average, 
expenditure Gini index in Indonesia is relatively 
moderate; however, the indicator of horizontal in-
equality is very high. Moreover, the average value 
of fiscal dependency and fiscal discretion of each 
province in Indonesia is still relatively high, de-
spite having a modest level of democracy and se-
curity, as well as a low level of social capital. In ad-
dition, the level of income per capita and number 
of population on average is quite high. 
In this study, we implemented a sequential ex-
planatory strategy. The collection and analysis of 
quantitative data in the first phase are followed 
by the qualitative part in the second phase, based 
on the results from the quantitative analysis [1]. 
The following benchmark model in cross-province 
level will be used as follows:
INEQit = β0 + β1 FDit + β2 Insit +
+ β3 (FDit × Insit) + β4 Xit + εit.               (1)
where β0 corresponds to the constant term, the sub-
script i denotes the province, t denotes the obser-
Table 1
Summary statistics of inequality estimates
Variables Observation Mean Std. Deviation Min Max
Gini*1 320 0.35 0.04 0.26 0.46
Group Gini*2 320 0.65 0.26 0.04 0.95
Fiscal dependency*3 319 0.76 0.1 0.43 0.96
Fiscal discretion*3 319 0.7 0.09 0.4 0.87
Democracy*4 192 67 6 52.6 83.9
Social capital*4 128 54.5 5.48 38 63.16
Crime rate*4 256 18 10.11 1.3 55.7
GRDP per capita*4 (log) 320 9.46 0.9 7.68 11.8
Population*4 (log) 320 15.2 1 13.44 17.64
*1 BPS — Badan Pusat Statistik (the Indonesia Statistical Agency).
*2 For further explanation of the formula, please see Stewart, F., Brown, G. & Mancini, L. (2005). Why Horizontal Inequalities Matter: 
Some Implications for Measurement. Retrieved from: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57a08c95e5274a31e00012e4/
wp19.pdf (Date of access: 12.8.2019).
*3 MoF — Ministry of Finance.
*4 BPS — Badan Pusat Statistik (the Indonesia Statistical Agency).
Source: Authors’ calculation.
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vation period (from 2005 to 2014), and ε is the cor-
responding disturbance term. Our dependent vari-
ables (INEQit) are expenditure Gini and group Gini 
indexes [17] that can capture vertical and horizon-
tal inequality, respectively. One of the main inter-
ests throughout the paper lies in the coefficient β1, 
which measures the impact of fiscal decentralisa-
tion (FDit) on regional proliferation. Here we used 
two indicators to gauge fiscal decentralisation at 
the sub-national level in a single-country analysis, 
as follows [18]: 1) Fiscal dependency ratio, which 
is the share of total balancing fund over total rev-
enue, and 2) Fiscal discretion, which is the sum of 
general allocation fund (DAU) and revenue shar-
ing fund (DBH) over total revenue. In this context, 
Ebel and Yilmaz stated that fiscal dependency and 
discretion ratio could be a method to capture fis-
cal imbalances and measure the extent of discre-
tionary power of spending of local government, 
respectively [18].
Besides fiscal decentralisation, our next vari-
able of interest is related to institutional quality. 
In this context, we wanted to capture the direct 
(Insit) and indirect effects (FDit × Insit) of institu-
tional quality on inequality as stated in the coef-
ficient β2 and β3, respectively. Few empirical stud-
ies have pointed out the important role of institu-
tional quality in inequality [3, 20]. However, none 
of them has analysed the indirect effect. This is 
partly due to the problem of measurement on in-
stitutional quality. Rothstein and Teorell stated 
that institutional quality can be best described 
on the input and output sides [15]. The former is 
related to the access to public authority (i.e. de-
mocracy), while the latter corresponds to the way 
in which authority is exercised (i.e. government 
quality or governance). 
Since there are no reliable data on the 
Indonesian inter-regional measures of institu-
tional quality, we used crime rate, democracy in-
dex, and social capital at the province level as proxy 
indicators. Thus, it is expected that those indica-
tors can capture some dimensions of institutional 
quality at input and output levels. Meanwhile, Xit 
is a vector of control variables that are assumed to 
have an influence on inequality. Such variables are 
based on our theoretical framework and existing 
literature on fiscal decentralisation and inequal-
ity in many countries such as GRDP per capita and 
population [3, 5, 19, 21]. 
To sum up, following Siddique et al. [6], we hy-
pothesise that the implementation of fiscal de-
centralisation in Indonesia will increase both ex-
penditure Gini and group Gini indexes. Just like 
Sepulveda and Martinez-Vazquez [3], we also expect 
that democracy is positively correlated with verti-
cal and horizontal inequality, hence, its mediating 
effect (FDit × Demit) will be negative. Meanwhile, 
we believe that social capital and law and order are 
both negatively correlated with expenditure Gini 
and group Gini indexes. Consequently, their inter-
active variables (i.e. FDit × Soscapit; FDit × Crimeit) 
will be positive. 
The above econometric analysis will be fol-
lowed by fieldwork analysis through the imple-
mentation of several semi-structured interviews 
(SSIs) based on expert judgement and focus group 
discussions (FGDs) that began in the last week of 
March 2019 and ended on the first week of July 
2019. Largely, the role of quality institution can 
be explained by looking at how intergovernmental 
fiscal transfer policy is planned and implemented 
at the districts/cities and provincial levels. To ap-
ply SSIs and FGDs, the respondents’ consent to 
give information was crucial. Such information 
was divided into 2 (two) parts that included sev-
eral open questions to the relevant stakeholders. 
In this context, the first part focusses the planning 
aspect, while the second part includes the imple-
mentation aspect, as follows:
(i). Are district/city and provincial govern-
ments involved in determining the allocation of 
intergovernmental fiscal transfers? How do dis-
trict/city, provincial, and central government offi-
cials perceive transparency in the allocation pro-
cess? What is the role of provincial government 
concerning transparency and elite capture in the 
allocation process? 
(ii). Does the current intergovernmental fis-
cal transfer policy give rise to the “fear factor” 
for sub-national governments to execute their 
budget? To what extent are district/city and pro-
vincial governments able and willing to manage 
intergovernmental fiscal transfers? Does the cur-
rent intergovernmental fiscal transfer remain in-
sufficient for local governments to implement 
their delegated responsibilities? 
Based on the aforementioned survey, the val-
idation of the model is conducted in the follow-
ing ways:
(i). Focus Group Discussions (FGDs)
This method is common in social research to 
collect general information from different per-
spectives [1]. Such information could be a means 
to obtain specific information when we conduct 
semi-structured interviews. In our research, we 
have conducted four FGDs. One FGD was focussed 
on stakeholders at the national level, as we in-
vited the bureaucrats in central government (e.g. 
Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Home Affairs, 
and Ministry of Planning and Development) and 
the member of the National Parliament (Dewan 
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Perwakilan Rakyat — DPR). Other three (3) FGDs 
focussed on stakeholders at the provincial and 
district/city levels, as we involved local govern-
ment apparatus such as Local Secretary (SETDA, 
Sekretaris Daerah), Local Development and 
Planning Agency (BAPPEDA, Badan Perencanaan 
Pembangunan Daerah), Local Government Unit 
Agencies (SKPD, Satuan Kerja dan Perangkat 
Daerah), and the member of the Local Parliament 
(Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah — DPRD). 
(ii). Expert Judgement
According to Moleong, expert judgement is an 
interview approach that utilises researchers/ob-
servers’ judgement to re-check the preliminary 
qualitative findings based on FGDs and econo-
metric results [1]. Instead of unstructured inter-
view, we chose to collect and assess any histori-
cal information and personal opinion in a practi-
cal manner through semi-structured interviews. 
In this study, we discussed the issue with experts/
observers involved at the national level, namely: 
1) Expert/observer on fiscal decentralisation; 2) 
Expert/observer on inequality; 3) Expert/observer 
on institutional quality. Those experts/observers 
have an academic background (e.g. University of 
Indonesia and Padjajaran University) and come 
from the relevant national organisations such as 
Committee for Implementation and Monitoring of 
Regional Autonomy (KPPOD, Komite Pemantauan 
Pelaksanaan Otonomi Daerah) and Indonesia 
Forum for Transparency (FITRA, Forum Indonesia 
untuk Transparansi). The academicians focussed 
on fiscal decentralisation and inequality aspect, 
while the latter provided inputs on the institu-
tional quality aspect. 
Moving to the case study, the selection sample 
of qualitative methods was based on two purpo-
sive arguments. First, Ministry of Finance stated 
that West Java province has low fiscal capacity. 
Second, the inter-regional measure of fiscal de-
pendency and discretion ratio in West Java ac-
counted for 70 % and 65 % of its total revenue, 
respectively. Since West Java consists of 27 dis-
tricts/cities, we did not collect qualitative infor-
mation from all districts due to time and cost con-
straints. Instead, we focussed on the stakehold-
ers in the city of Depok and regency of Bekasi, as 
Ministry of Finance categorised them as having 
high and low fiscal capacity, respectively. In ad-
dition, the economic profiles of these regions dif-
fer from each other. While the former is closely re-
lated to the growth in manufacture and services 
sector, the regency of Bekasi is associated with the 
resource-rich region. Therefore, such profiles es-
tablish the analytical difference between the dy-
namic of institutional quality. 
4. Results
We aimed to examine how fiscal decentralisa-
tion indicators, represented by fiscal dependency 
and discretion ratio, affects inequality, measured 
by expenditure Gini and group Gini indexes. Based 
on estimations obtained in the period 2005–
2014, we have 108–319 observations that cover 32 
provinces. 
We started to analyse the nexus between fis-
cal decentralisation and vertical inequality with 
the basic panel of fixed effects (FE) estimations 
with standard error-correcting method. Such a 
method can resolve the issue of heteroscedas-
ticity. We also considered the issue of cross-sec-
tional dependence due to spatial effects and un-
observed common factors [23]. The previous test-
parm analysis indicated that it is necessary to use 
both province and year FE when estimating ex-
penditure Gini index. In principle, we used year 
FE to control time-variant unobserved charac-
teristics. Simultaneously, province FE can control 
province-specific time-invariant in the regression. 
In the standard FE model, we can see that the 
nexus between fiscal decentralisation and verti-
cal inequality can be best explained through de-
mocracy when the provinces in Java Island are ex-
cluded from the analysis. Here, both fiscal decen-
tralisation indicators are positively and signif-
icantly correlated with expenditure Gini index. 
Such result is similar to Bojanic’s study, where 
he revealed a positive association between ex-
penditure decentralisation and income Gini index 
when the equation excluded the U.S. and Canada. 
In addition, similar to Sepulveda and Martinez-
Vazquez’s findings, democracy is significantly and 
positively correlated with vertical inequality. 
Pertaining to the indirect effect of democracy 
on inequality, there is a negative and significant 
correlation between the interactive variable, de-
mocracy and fiscal decentralisation, and inequal-
ity. Such finding suggests that democracy plays an 
important role in the fiscal decentralisation–ver-
tical inequality nexus. In addition, as Sepulveda 
and Martinez-Vazquez stated in their study, there 
is a positive and significant correlation between 
population and expenditure Gini index. 
Since institution and fiscal decentralisation 
are endogenous [5, 23], we have to solve the en-
dogeneity issue using the appropriate estimation 
that considers the unobserved country-specific 
effect, autocorrelation, and short panel dataset. 
Thus, we implemented a two-step system gener-
alised method of moments (GMM) to obtain the fi-
nite-sample corrected two-step covariance matrix 
[24]. In addition, we could not perform and esti-
mate a two-step GMM on social capital in the rela-
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Table 2 
Panel regression between fiscal decentralisation and vertical inequality
Exp. variables
Dep. variable: expenditure Gini index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)







































Fiscal dep × soc.cap −0.001(0.001)
5 e−04
(0.01)





Fiscal dis × dem
Fiscal dis × soc.cap
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Observation 319 192 162 192 128 108 256 216 256
Groups 32 32 27 32 32 27 32 27 32
Instruments — — — 22 — — — — 30
Lag — — — 2 — — — — 2
AR (1) — — — 0.002 — — — — 0.001
AR (2) — — — 1 — — — — 0.36
Hansen test — — — 0.47 — — — — 0.14
R-squared within 0.62 0.51 0.5 — 0.6 0.56 0.63 0.62 —
Continuation of the Table 2
Exp. variables
Dep. variable: expenditure Gini index
(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)




































Fiscal dep × dem
Continuation of the Table next page
997K. Digdowiseiso, E. Sugiyanto, H. D. Setiawan
Экономика региона, Т. 16, вып. 3 (2020)
Exp. variables
Dep. variable: expenditure Gini index
(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
FE FE FE Sys GMM FE FE FE FE
Sys 
GMM
Fiscal dep × soc.cap
Fiscal dep × crime













































Observation 319 192 162 192 128 108 256 216 256
Groups 32 32 27 32 32 27 32 27 32
Instruments — — — 22 — — — − 30
Lag — — — 2 — — — — 2
AR (1) — — — 0.002 — — — — 0.001
AR (2) — — — 0.96 — — — — 0.28
Hansen test — — — 0.6 — — — — 0.14
R-squared within 0.62 0.5 0.5 — 0.6 0.57 0.63 0.62 —
Notes to Table 2: The number of parentheses represents the robust standard error where *** = significant at 1 percent level, ** = signif-
icant at 5 percent level, and * = significant at 10 percent level. In equations (3), (6), (8), (12), (15), and (17), we excluded provinces 
located on Java island. In the GMM method, as an instrument variable we used the natural logarithm of distance, which is the size 
of the province divided by the number of local governments. Full results are available upon request.
Source: Authors’ calculation.
tionship between fiscal decentralisation and verti-
cal inequality due to limited observation.
In Table 2, a robustness check on two-step sys-
tem GMM yields even better results than the ba-
sic FE model in terms of size and magnitude. The 
finding confirms the previous estimation that fis-
cal decentralisation indicators, democracy, and 
their interactive variables are positively and sig-
nificantly correlated with expenditure Gini index. 
In addition, income per capita, which was insig-
nificant in the previous estimation, is positively 
correlated with vertical inequality. Such finding 
confirms Sepulveda and Martinez-Vazquez’s and 
Sacchi and Salotti’s result. 
Regarding the relationship between fiscal de-
centralisation and horizontal inequality, the time 
FE test suggested that only province FE used in the 
standard FE model. Based on a full sample of prov-
inces, Table 3 shows that both fiscal decentralisa-
tion indicators are negatively correlated with hori-
zontal inequality. Moreover, there is a negative 
and significant relationship between social capi-
tal and horizontal inequality. Similar to Stewart’s 
study where she believed that unequal access of 
social capital led to persistence of horizontal ine-
quality [25], there might be an indication that so-
cial capital in Indonesia is asymmetric. In this con-
text, group members may have stronger contacts 
within their own group than across groups. In ad-
dition, social capital plays a major role in the rela-
tionship between fiscal decentralisation and hori-
zontal inequality since there is a positive and sig-
nificant correlation between the interactive varia-
ble, fiscal discretion and social capital, and group 
Gini index. 
When we excluded provinces located in Java 
Island from the estimation, we revealed that both 
fiscal decentralisation indicators are negatively 
and significantly correlated with group Gini in-
dex. Additionally, the crime rate, which reflects 
law and order, is negatively and significantly cor-
related with horizontal inequality. Such a find-
ing is similar to Sonora’s results [26]. Accordingly, 
improvements in legal systems could reduce ine-
quality in the Latin American and other countries 
worldwide. 
Considering democracy estimation, we discov-
ered that both fiscal decentralisation indicators 
are positively and significantly correlated with 
group Gini. In addition, there is a positive and 
significant relationship between democracy and 
group Gini index, while its interactive variable 
Continuation of the Table 2
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Table 3 
Panel regression between fiscal decentralisation and horizontal inequality
Exp. Variables
Dep. variable: group Gini index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
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Observation 319 192 162 192 128 108 256 216 256
Groups 32 32 27 32 32 27 32 27 32
Instruments — — — 22 — — — — 30
Lag — — — 2 — — — — 2
AR (1) — — — 0.01 — — — — 0.01
AR (2) — — — 0.6 — — — — 0.52
Hansen test — — — 0.69 — — — — 0.49
R−squared within 0.01 0.09 0.14 — 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.14 —
Continuation of the Table 3
Exp. Variables
Dep. variable: group Gini index
(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
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Fiscal dep × crime
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with fiscal decentralisation indicators produces a 
negative and significant effect on horizontal in-
equality. Such condition is similar to the results 
from the expenditure inequality equation. For the 
sake of robustness check, following the previous 
estimation of vertical inequality, we conducted a 
two-step system GMM. However, both fiscal de-
centralisation indicators lost their size and mag-
nitude when democracy and crime rate were taken 
into account.
5. Discussion
Based on the quantitative results, it is obvi-
ous that institutional quality plays an important 
role in the nexus between fiscal decentralisation 
and inequality. Considering this argument, our 
fieldwork results indicated several problems on 
how the current intergovernmental fiscal trans-
fer policy was designed and implemented at the 
sub-national government level. These issues could 
worsen the development of a local government. 
Considering the planning aspect, Law No. 
32/2004 on Local Government states that central 
government should involve every sub-national 
government in designing intergovernmental fiscal 
transfer policy since they have sufficient knowl-
edge and information on the preferences of lo-
cal people. In fact, our FGD at the local govern-
ment level confirmed that the central government 
through Ministry of Finance (MoF) continued to 
adopt the so-called “top-down” approach in the 
allocation of such transfer. During FGD at Bekasi 
and Depok, both Suherly, a senior employee from 
Local Secretary in Bekasi, and Masikin, an em-
ployee from Local Development and Planning Unit 
in Depok, stated “In designing the allocation, the 
central government did not emphasise the need 
and capacity of local government.” 1 This argument 
was later denied by one participant from FGD at 
the national level. Gustaf, a senior rank official 
from Ministry of Official, pointed out the follow-
ing: “We always implemented a “bottom-up” ap-
proach in intergovernmental fiscal transfer policy 
in an appropriate manner that included the allo-
cation.” 2 While he claimed that local governments 
were involved in designing such a policy, our ex-
pert judgement from the national organisation in-
dicated the nuance of “top-down” approach, as all 
of them highlighted the lack of transparency in 
the allocation process. 
Based on the above analyses, there is a pos-
sibility that the democratic process of design-
ing intergovernmental fiscal transfer policy de-
pends more on certain elites, as mentioned by 
Scheve and Stasavage [27]. In this context, besides 
the potential economic rent-seeking within the 
inner circle of the MoF, every government level 
1 FGD with local government stakeholders in Bekasi and Depok 
on 27 March 2019 and 18 April 2019, respectively.
2 FGD with national government stakeholders in Jakarta on 15 
May 2019. 
Continuation of the Table 3















































Observation 319 192 162 192 128 108 256 216 256
Groups 32 32 27 32 32 27 32 27 32
Instruments — — — 22 — — — — 30
Lag — — — 2 — — — — 2
AR (1) — — — 0.01 — — — — 0.01
AR (2) — — — 0.6 — — — — 0.47
Hansen test — — — 0.62 — — — — 0.82
R−squared within 0.01 0.11 0.17 — 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.11 —
Notes: The number of parentheses represents the robust standard error where *** = significant at 1 percent level, ** = significant at 
5 percent level, and * = significant at 10 percent level. In equations (3), (6), (8), (12), (15), and (17), we excluded provinces located 
in Java Island. In the GMM method, as an instrument variable, we used the natural logarithm of distance, which is the size of the 
province divided by the number of local governments. Full results are available upon request. 
Source: Authors’ calculation.
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might try influencing the MoF’s decision to gain 
or even to raise allocations to the prospective/cap-
tured regions. Though in the process of FGD with 
the national stakeholders such claim was denied, 
our expert from the national organisation proved 
that there were several interventions, as multi-
ple stakeholders tried to influence the allocation. 1 
Some action required the so-called “direct inter-
vention” where the head of a local government di-
rectly visited the central government. Even some 
Mayor dan Regent instructed their head of the lo-
cal government unit (SKPD) to accompany and 
lobby the allocation process. In addition, since 
fiscal transfer involved the political process and 
support from multiple government stakeholders, 
members of the Local and National Parliament 
could capture such a process in an attempt to 
maintain and increase the number of existing and 
potential voters at the election. Even local execu-
tives had an economic rent-seeking motive, since 
their influence on the allocation process could de-
termine the scale of development projects in their 
region. Moreover, there was a possibility that the 
local government apparatus had a bureaucratic 
rent-seeking motive since intergovernmental fis-
cal transfer served as a means for job promotion. 
In line with the democracy capture and 
rent-seeking motive, every provincial govern-
ment should play a critical role in solving such 
problems. According to Law No. 32/2004 on Local 
Government, they should address the issue of rel-
ative deprivation, particularly related to intergov-
ernmental fiscal transfer. In this context, the dis-
crepancy between aspirations of the district/city 
governments and the central government’s expec-
tations should be minimised. In fact, our FGD with 
local government stakeholders stated that the pro-
vincial government tended to worsen the elite cap-
ture and rent-seeking phenomenon in the pro-
cess of location and allocation determination. Such 
claims were later denied during FGD with the pro-
vincial stakeholders, where both Suheni, an em-
ployee of the Local Development Planning unit, 
and Nanang, an employee of the Local Secretary, 
stated the following: “We always served the best in-
terest of local people within our districts/cities. The 
accusations of rent-seeking and elite capture at the 
provincial level were completely irrelevant.” 2
The problems occurring at the planning level 
seriously affect the implementation level. Based 
on FGD results at the local and provincial levels, 
1 Expert judgement of Hartanto from KPPOD and Edi from 
FITRA in Jakarta on 11 June 2019 and 20 June 2019, respectively.
2 FGD with provincial government stakeholders in Bandung on 
30 April 2019.
the implementation of intergovernmental fiscal 
transfer is regulated by technical guidance. Such 
“partial” decentralisation á la Faguet and Poschl 
indicates where local governments in Indonesia 
do not have decision-making autonomy [28]. Since 
the guidance was established by central govern-
ment, the problems of implementation of such 
transfer occurred at the sub-national government 
level. During our FGD at the local and provincial 
levels, the interviewees stated that such technical 
guidance was too rigid to be implemented since 
the arrangement process did not involve sub-na-
tional government stakeholders. Moreover, cen-
tral government was always late in issuing such 
guidances. Since local government officials are 
afraid of making mistakes and breaking the rules, 
the current policy provides the so-called «fear fac-
tor» for local governments to limit their spending.
Finally, the phenomenon of democracy cap-
ture and rent-seeking motive behind intergov-
ernmental fiscal transfer creates another prob-
lem at the implementation level where, accord-
ing to Law No. 32/2004, every local government 
must conduct obligatory affairs related and unre-
lated to basic public services, along with some op-
tional affairs. In this context, during our FGD with 
Bekasi stakeholders, they stated that the number 
of intergovernmental fiscal transfers they received 
was not insufficient to implement those affairs. 
However, our FGD with Depok stakeholders re-
vealed that they often received an allocation that 
exceeded their capacity to implement their affairs. 
Regarding this paradox, our experts believed that 
it happened due to the problem at the planning 
level, as there were political and economic mo-
tives behind intergovernmental fiscal transfer. 3 
6. Conclusion
The study presents new data the relationship 
between fiscal decentralisation and inequality in 
Indonesia. We applied several FE estimations to 
examine whether fiscal decentralisation, repre-
sented by fiscal dependency and discretion ratio, 
has some effect on inequality, measured by ex-
penditure Gini and group Gini indexes. We also 
analysed whether institutional quality plays a me-
diating role in the nexus between fiscal decentral-
isation and inequality. To complement the quan-
titative results, we used qualitative methods and 
conducted several SSIs based on expert judgement 
and FGDs where multiple government stakehold-
ers assessed how intergovernmental fiscal transfer 
3 Expert judgement of Suhendar from Tirtayasa University 
in Banten on 26 June 2019 and Komaruddin from Padjajaran 
University in Bandung on 04 July 2019, respectively. 
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policy in Indonesia is designed and implemented 
at the local government level. 
The main result of the empirical examination 
is the identification of a robust, positive, and sig-
nificant relationship between fiscal decentral-
isation and vertical quality when democracy is 
taken into account. Meanwhile, fiscal decentrali-
sation is negatively correlated with horizontal in-
equality when estimation includes social capital. 
However, such finding is not robust as it cannot 
solve the endogeneity problem. In addition, fiscal 
decentralisation appears to have a marginal im-
pact on horizontal inequality when both democ-
racy and crime rate are considered in the full sam-
ple analysis. However, when we exclude provinces 
located in Java Island, the impact of fiscal decen-
tralisation on horizontal inequality becomes clear. 
For example, both fiscal decentralisation indica-
tors are positively correlated with group Gini in-
dex when democracy is taken into account. In con-
trast, the opposite result occurs when the crime 
rate is taken into account.
Our quantitative findings are somewhat con-
sistent with the fieldwork results where institu-
tional quality does matter in explaining the nexus 
between fiscal decentralisation and inequality. 
Here, the political and economic motives that 
constitute democracy capture and rent-seeking 
behaviour could influence the intergovernmental 
fiscal transfer policy in Indonesia. Those factors 
are crucial in explaining why Indonesian fiscal de-
centralisation is positively correlated with vertical 
inequality and has a marginal impact on horizon-
tal inequality, respectively. 
To summarise, the central government should 
focus on improving managerial and administra-
tive capacity of bureaucrats at every government 
level. However, such an approach requires collec-
tive action and commitment that involve multiple 
government stakeholders. Besides the improve-
ment of bureaucratic quality, to effectively imple-
ment fiscal decentralisation policy, law and order 
are needed to reduce the effect of democratic cap-
ture and rent-seeking on other development as-
pects such as growth and poverty. Therefore, our 
crucial and detailed analysis study can be the ba-
sis for future research. 
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